

Present: Ingrid, Melanie, Diana, Sam, David S., Marc, Scott, Donell, Bouchra, Samia, Jan N  
 Remote: Hrastav, Vladimir, Christos, Roberto C., Mischa S., Danièle Vayetti, Marcus H.,  
 Reimer, Licia, Michal P., Nicolas L

APAC - date 22-27

13<sup>th</sup> Welcome. Agenda: - future meeting planning → timing & funding?

list of deliverables still needs to be done.  
 discussed again.

@comms engagement.

- next time: impact of QC on keys and crypto → R&T discussion.  
 appropriate for APAC IGF.

Motions: Donell.

15<sup>th</sup> Erickson / APG IOPMA: see slides

18<sup>th</sup> Donell / TAG IOPMA update: see slides. W3PM has sent a trust anchor, it ought to be accredited by now:

Grid Community forum set up with steering group and on github.

14<sup>th</sup> OIDC Fed / David S.:

relation SAML2 ↔ OIDC Fed → general token core of by QN\* → The role of auth. federations will need a generic trust framework for that. The model will be similar - trusted by all. Apart from trust, everything is different; from local to metadata federation. Some of that is native to the OIDC discovery & align client registration.

In OIDC there is an explicit metadata exchange method.

Trust reg. most nipp.

14<sup>th</sup> Davide V / QIANT & APAC: (see slides)

"effective connection of RPs" in APAC

- In OIDC world there is

(look at fed spec 1.0 rev) →

now: how to sign/create the chain of signing keys effectively & responsive.

↳ online signing service. (both discovery and client auth API).

Add to agenda

- documents needed?

- Sctfi - RP binding.

David V /

There can be parallel federations - no model imposed by standard.  
Very open - no NIST approval needed.

- options are also pushed to edge for federations.

- resemble SAML federations with one trust anchor and all aggregated metadata with one federation key to rule them all.

But it can be 'stopped' at any level, abc@Org.

both HD statements and signing keys can be by reference (URL's)

15<sup>33</sup> / Michel P : EUDX & LSAMP.

There are for now just a couple of clients. As it extends beyond EUDX12 (cloud) service providers will be using OIDC - and there are many, esp. for toll of LS. Standard registration is needed.

And do it soon, before LSAMP kicks off. (RSN, Q1/Q2 2018, so soon!)

Level of trust by IGF will be Org + SctfI qualified.

PI specific stuff ("able to handle human data") will anyway be inside the ESFPI's.

SctfI SCI would be good enough.

Now how: RP's take an active role in federation (in PVIX it's user initiated). Interact with orgs.

The general model by David V needs ~~scale testing~~, scalability tests.

- And is more the bilateral enforcement of technology. but processes/procedures or the individuals.

- change management. → rapid cycling of keys through refs URL's.  
target ~ 15 min., so you need HD/redundancy.

[ - but you can trust pre-registered URL's (and you trust pre-configured https:-) ]

16<sup>32</sup> JimB/CILogon SCITokens (see slides)

- analogy to trust anchor distribution (RGPs sign distribution).

- policy and practices needed for XSEDE

- Compare CILogon (Auth) to SCIToken (Auth) or with + scope access token.

SimB// Client registration: the RP should be in the 'community' (ROLE) within the org, RGS category.

↳ dynamic client reg in federation context → caps.

↳ translate "tags" into (overlapping) federations (could be "different federation" (so there will be a set of IGTF federations! :-))

You can chain (& mesh) federations.

need not be make a single root. → flattening is possible.,  
adding to JSON is more complex (also Downside).

- a single root is not needed

devolve decision to RP (consortium)? fed per "owner" of the, say, RGS  
'one who owns a policy set runs a federation'?

- org with many end-users, → devolve via orgs.

↳ complexity? meta-data authorities proliferation.

and you then need aggregation of type of EGI, NLGEG, &c.

↳ scalability earlier led to edugain central.

→ scalability needs →  $\mathcal{O}(100)$ . @IGTF will be considered

actual OP's: < 100 RPs:  $\gg 100k$ , but  $\mathcal{O}(\infty)$  orgs.

17<sup>th</sup> Niclas / EGI & AARC & B2 ACCESS: see slides

\* Integrated presentation EOSC-HUB@NI, describe both systems.

goal "scalable" & "trusted" from oIDC Fed.

now: best  $\mathcal{O}(50-100)$ , in next year  $\mathcal{O}(100-1000)$ .

then cloud services with many services per user. → caps.  $\mathcal{O}(1M+)$ .

current client reg does not do revocation or maintenance of clients.

↳ monitoring needed. → oIDC endpoints are public, and can be tested.

PMAL

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EOSC //

- in EGII, clients need to comply with policies (EGII See Policies). via Optteam.
- in EUOPT it's self-assessed.

also this needs to be checked

Peter reviewed self-assessments → hierarchical model, by org.  
also an EGII Res "feel" now and suspended.

Naray/NATTs + "OADC-Agent": (see slides) → use cases!

"ADC-Agent" just like ssh-agent.

potentially (#users \* #devices) → O(1M+) clients.

very appealing to XSEDE as well (SimB).

one level of indirection by client-introduced clients (but that's out of scope of fed spec).

policy should be tackled, because clients are also (implicitly) services and can act as such. → limit to Access Tokens, could solve this.

RNP tick box if they are not techn capable of running a service.

17<sup>60</sup>

End of day 1

2010.01.23 //2

09<sup>61</sup> Remote people: Cosmin, Vladimir, Nikolay, Roberto, Miriam Pitschyan

09<sup>62</sup> Cosmin // \* Austrian Grid - no response. → email does not work.

(ACT) will be suspended by next distribution by end of Feb.

\* RDIG, still pending. Ask self-assess next week in Geneva.

(ACT)

\* German Grid: will be updated tomorrow

\* UGrid: DONE (Dimitar Rec to do)

09<sup>63</sup> Boucra // Magrid Updates: (see slides).

The RPs are now all located in Robert - hard on travel, and many users are PhD candidates that leave too soon to be an effective RP.

Considering TCS for Magrid use cases as well, but need euHPCIN connect first which is not yet there.

Not SAML issuance can work, but for O(100), but not thousands.

CESNET runs own portal working api, but that is more work.

- eIDPKI → euRoam only.

## 0956 / Comm's RP's

relevance: OIDC is a value proposition. →

published: PEPR newsletter; BLOGS.

as OIDC feel becomes more concrete → propaganda.; "it needs funds and policies"  
invite folk from EOSC-HUB who are funded to do this.

scope should help: there was no alternative for RI/EP

and it's inertia in orgs that will be the challenge for adHOC/REFERS.

Targeted meeting for propaganda., and high PARC sessions.  
with a concrete pilot to show.

How does that attracts new RP members: they can influence the direction.

RP's can use it to exchange ideas and also learn from each other  
(also sharing Snafis and policy lists).

Who likes to join: Life sciences (but we see the IT proponents)

(act)

RENES/ISKA. → part of WP 6.1.

LIGO/Virgo → for OIDC

} needs other demonstrator  
optional.

Get the message across that IGTF is taking this up (and not going away).

- for the tech demo: NIShe + Douke + SimB ( $\sim 0.5-1$  FTE?)
- for propaganda: EOSC-HUB + PARC effort, and invite these communities in there.

④ ↗ \* NISE community: dedicate time to Snafis & OIDC & policy list for SCI session.

(ACT)

talk in plenary about the IGTF/OIDC feel.

- for propaganda: Sara Coelho - describing this to her also helps to clarify the ideas themselves.

③ ↗

also involve GENT folks & Laura!

- talk at IGS & TNC in an PARC session.

- GENT/Conned magazine feature or article?

In vdo also TAGPMA. (SimB).+Derek.

OIDC feel might attract funding also for Latin America (and Africa of RP)?

(ACT)

- talk of APfid/PfD.

- PARC InfoShare, poster@ISCG.

other communities: math. projects (like DynaMo in the US)?

based on response from (191920) surveys (like on RUP?).

| Joris, (Björn Kortz)  
Mariam P, ~~JMK~~

10<sup>st</sup>/Coffee // 11<sup>th</sup> Smetfi. [Remote: + Uros, Nuno, Roberto, Hannah, J. Dens, Reimer, Mirela, Vladimir, Smetfi: offshoot of SCIV1, published Mar 2017 and now in TNC 7 proceedings  
Assessing RP's is getting more important for ODC Fed, for O(Geo)  
it can be assessed, but not O(Geo) services.  
so assess communities, not services.

Smalifi implicitly requires Sirtfi.

RP's more important (see before), like in EOSC-HUB Vision of EOSC-HUB is  
to be a hub with very many services and communities; including  
thematic services.

Policy development kit also important for EOSC-HUB, <sup>better</sup>~~also~~ PARC.

EGI-SPG has an expansive set. Work items of EOSC-HUB.

- alignment of AWP's

- GDPR guidelines

- VM management in clouds, for 'hierarchical' service offerings (VAR's).  
beyond VM's to containers, both end-users and micro services,  
or a user-level job, or offering services from containers.

'PDK': from NPA2 PARC: focus on Research Communities for Federation

as a basis use ~~fedor~~ SCIV1 & Smetfi for each of the components

management of docs: where they are stored but allow branding with  
logos.

Templating approach (e.g. track with GitHub? -) | attribution to projects  
will be fine by convention

morph SCIV3 into the policy development kit. → NISE community workshop

grouping themes of EGI-SPG page

priority: start with community policies and the RUP

also feels the sharing needs for NPA2.

PMAW

PDK II How much commonality there is in the policies? AUPs can give a hint.

in many cases its minor changes, but some are very different!

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- Helmholtz Declaration, as sacrificial lamb. - they need it about now

- EOSC-HUB needs to have a framework to merge EG-I and EUDAT

EUDAT also needs to revise the policy anyway.

- for, e.g., BBMRI a layered AUP would work

- for EG-I all statements are required,

an RI should be able to say "we are compliant to SCI v2 and meet --" and meet a baseline profile.

+ elements can be OK, to be also a basis for a risk-based model

\* small communities might just take policies as-is!

For starters: for the review

- structure of the kit (SCI based + grouping based on EG-I)
- community centric SciFi policies
- AUP, comm sec. pols (2x)

data protection: we need CoCo v2 results (would that work?)

application-level data protection is out of scope, but a user-issue!

for "us" stick to low-risk attributes.

PDK: → clearly define scope to infra-ops.

→ does incur risk. / opsec

Model

SPG: Documents wiki

↳ reporting (72 hr data breach)

would that work between services?

Gdoc: AACC Policy subteam: google doc [https://bit.ly/2Hannh](#)

(the gdoc is a rough assembly of ideas & refs for now)

- more abstract categories. →

- for adoption: you need community to do a risk assessment and then decide on which policies you need, and what to tweak.

- flanchard model for risk assessment by communities to help pick the right policy set

- look at staff TF-OPR (Antonie C) did for an example.

- NISE Risk Assessment Working group. RAN-NG.

PRAC2.

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join WISE for getting risk going.

12:30 / Lunch 11/16/00

14<sup>th</sup> Jan v1 / AUP Policy: (see Wiki page on PRAC2 Wiki).

AUP clauses matching with EGI as a basis, ↳ EGI/EUDAT/ELIXIR are similar, with the PRACE one being different.

Comparing with the ATFC one to see an extreme and the ELIXIR one has some community-specific elements, mapping shows elements that are unique.

- Where does the user see the AUP.

↳ in PRACE the home site takes the role of 'community' for AUP ticking.

the "peaceful" in PRACE would probably already have been covered by the project review so is a duplicate, but lowers risks for sites...

- scale of analysis: choose common denom, then build on it by hierarchy.

↳ can we build identical words for the minimum ↳ allow X-ET use

↳ categories, on top of that

↳ have a guide to usage of the template.

↳ have a baseline that "should not be changed" and then allow to extend (but not degrade :) the items or add items.

But the baseline will then be harmonized.

getting adoption with infra's also via WISE. to get XSEDE (and OSG?)

for Europe: talk via PRAC2 N23, then REFIGIS (end of Mar after WISE).

Site AUP's are usually overly complex because they (have to) allow private use.  
(Helmholtz does not have one yet).

Before WISE: - joint discussion PRAC2 - EOSC at all meetings.

- strawman AUP (maybe based on EGI) with EUDAT/PRACE involvement.  
start with structure.

↳ Ralph

GNSE SC1 NG - involve more people.

March - formalize v1

in time for PRAC2 review.

RUP/Iannu: Cross-training problem, plan, but people don't know what they want.  
(4<sup>th</sup>)

- Incident Response
- Assurance Profiles.

Scott/NIST: (see slides)

- 63D is not an afterthought, but was not ready in time for incl in 63C.
- Why is federated assurance different? real-world alignment because of flexibility and interpretation guidance.
  - flexibility now leads to confusion - but disc. on "real" standard over one single scale, which was proposed but failed.
  - Analysis to be conducted with OIDC and SAML 2 federations, like e.g. and eIDAS.

For making final, overall decisions you need to consider all vector elements  
it's still early days for understanding.

REFEDS brought out "identifier", and "association freshness".

Sociologically, 2-3 is optimal number of choices. 4 is too much, too simple.

Too many profiles now? many in RFC 6711 levels registry.

REFEDS adds 2, AADL SRA adds 2 levels, meanwhile in IANNI.

Which risk inspires which level? → risk levels are (expected to be) in there  
(5<sup>th</sup>) looking to -53 should have been there.

16<sup>th</sup> Assm. Assess Matrix (Dg) // review when in v0.3.

RFC § 4.2.4 non-verified information. - may technically to express  
which elements are verified if not all is certified.  
but unverified info may be useful (language, choice or so)  
not addressed by IGTF AP's. (yet).  
- like to idea for per-attribute assurance (and provenance). c.f. SenseIT

in PKIX embed policies (object then need to address : (C

in the Community membership policy, also did not address -- implicit assumption that that data is 'correct'. But in many cases much data are self-service editable. But RP's expect verified.

in RFC3647 8.2.4 → needs statement in AP's. !

17<sup>03</sup> Karlsruhe meeting May 10 23-25 May lunch-lunch.

Mar 24/03<sup>20</sup> Marc → new PKI is now there. CNRS wanted to dominate and now moved to ministry. New GridFR CA is actually 4: Root + 3xICP. classic AP; based on "open trust PKI" operated by the ministry. Enrollment and it are still the same, with same RA structure. signing machines are all at the ministry. Only service portals @ Renater. now: with robots.

TCS "is not the chosen solution" (because of operational model FG & TCSFR).

only technical changes (3xICA and backing software). + HSM.

- same namespace.

- reverse proxy in front of online ca. (also for IPv6)

Olk Approved + distr. 9

in next release end of Feb!

Davef // RCanthu.

because of CRL signing needs option #1

also used by others, but typically in A-P standby. HA.

#1 chosen as Olk.

- person leaving requires notice long enough to cycle keys of ICP.

(local backup via HSM will remain possible) → key destruction impossible

⇒ Leaving must be defined in CP/CPS.

⇒ define transfer process in advance.

legal entity: consortium with 4 legal entities

for embargo purposes: maybe required to non-affected country?

motivation is a risk → but no partners are at risk at the moment.

⇒ "contract" between ops members → Noll

regular updates to KTF

## 1.9 Coffee

1.30 // German grid, Ingrid. Self-audit GridVA-CA -

- IPv6 will be done early Feb '18

- SHA-1 for a root is still fine.

- CP/CPS has been at there since 2014 →

new CP/CPS in Monstra meeting.

↳ send to reviewers Ian Nell Scott R.

CAPI req. from Uni Bonn. use e.g. "grid-ha.de",

but its not required to honour CAPI by GridPP CP.

1.40 / Sven's Soapbox! "sharing experiences"

We had CAOPS, ... also about software for CA's like OpenCA models &c  
for new stuff (like IoT) introduce EC keys, or interesting linking  
to network management system (CERN).

can you think of "CA as a service"? copying happens anyway --

like plugging in IdP in Pathfinder (assert) CA.

↳ assert & XML attributes for Sifteo or Birch in the result  
from the moonshot exchange.

why trust this Birch CA → audit, or trust based on 3<sup>rd</sup> party or  
other assertions. Or a legal letter from the org.

Who signs the compliance statements? Legal or a chiefful person (adm).  
(using reforms.)

should then provisioning code can be shared?

many CA's do similar things like Rcauth, Pathfinder, etc

but MyProxy with moonshot does not work with pathfinder CA.

practice of sharing "elements" (code, snippets). → we need a sharing forum.

(TCS does as example - don't need to be signed by legal.)

how to communicate? more meetings is not an option ...

don't loose the expertise on CAOPS list (non-IGTF people).  
send mail to CAOPS. → links to existing repositories

- who to volunteer to kickstart CACOPS again?  
maybe others on the cacops list?  
not that many tokens.

on redmine add links to github repos.

- ✓ - people with code should publish
  - / - and add link to it on redmine.
-